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Abstract—Among existing privacy-preserving approaches, 
Differential Privacy (DP) is a powerful tool that can provide pri-
vacy-preserving noisy query answers over statistical databases 
and has been widely adopted in many practical fields. In particu-
lar, as a privacy machine of DP, Randomized Aggregable Priva-
cy-Preserving Ordinal Response (RAPPOR) enables strong pri-
vacy, efficient, and high-utility guarantees for each client string 
in data crowdsourcing. However, as for Internet of Things(IoT), 
such as smart gird, data are often processed in batches. Therefore, 
developing a new random response algorithm that can support 
batch-processing tend to make it more efficient and suitable for 
IoT applications than existing random response algorithms. In 
this paper, we propose a new randomized response algorithm 
that can achieve differential-privacy and utility guarantees for 
consumer’s behaviors, and process a batch of data at each time. 
Firstly, by applying sparse coding in this algorithm, a behavior 
signature dictionary is created from the aggregated energy con-
sumption data in fog. Then, we add noise into the behavior signa-
ture dictionary by classical randomized response techniques and 
achieve the differential privacy after data re-aggregation. 
Through the security analysis with the principle of differential 
privacy and experimental results verification, we find that our 
Algorithm can preserve consumer’s privacy without comprising 
utility. 
Keywords—Differential Privacy; Randomized Response; Sparse 
Coding; IoT; Smart Grid 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Differential privacy [1-6] constitutes a strong standard for 
privacy guarantees in statistical databases. Due to its property 
of rigid and provable privacy guarantee, differentially private 
database mechanisms can make confidential data widely avail-
able for accurate data analysis and data statistics [3]. Although 
the traditional Laplace mechanism is applicable to numerical 
query results, in many practical applications, query results are 
logical objects [7-8]. A recent privacy-preserving crowdsourc-
ing mechanism, Randomized Aggregable Privacy-Preserving 
Ordinal Response (RAPPOR) [9], is proposed in 2014, which 
has substantially improved the statistical crowdsourcing tech-
nology. Since then, RAPPOR has been adopted and enhanced 
by many researchers to generate specialized Randomized Re-
sponse algorithms that can be used in specific fields, such as 
machine learning [10-15]. 
RAPPOR may be used to solve the problem of privacy 
protection in smart grid which shares some similarity with the 
crowdsourcing environment. As the next-generation power 
system, smart grid is a special Internet of things system that 
that envisioned to provide efficient and reliable energy deliv-
ery [16]. To realize fine-grained optimization and real-time 
management for energy supply, numerous smart meters are 
installed at the consumers’ home to gather the energy con-
sumption data at high frequency and upload the data to the 
control center [17]. However, these detailed data usually in-
clude privacy-sensitive information with regard to the con-
sumer’s application consumption patterns, which raises the 
consumer’s behavior privacy concerns [18].  
Actually, there are numerous works contributing on the 
privacy preservation in smart grid. Traditional schemes mainly 
contain the following three aspects. Firstly, Homomorphic 
encryption [19-21] is a common solution to preserve consum-
er’s privacy. However, it introduces a heavy computational 
overhead and always needs a third party for random secret 
sharing distribution [22]. Secondly, battery-based load hiding 
(BLH) method is to hide the actual electricity consumption 
data of appliance by charging and discharging the battery [23-
27], but the environmental effects and cost caused by chargea-
ble battery can’t be ignored. 
DP has been applied in IoT to protect customers’ privacy. 
Existing differential privacy schemes in smart grid mainly 
focus on the individual energy consumption data [28-32] and 
adding noise into the energy consumption data is the common 
solution to provide differential privacy. Nevertheless, the noisy 
data may affect the data-utility and have a bad impact on sev-
eral services such as electricity billing in smart grid.  
RAPPOR provides strong privacy, efficient, and high-
utility guarantees for each client string in data crowdsourcing. 
It is an intuitive idea to apply RAPPOR for differential privacy 
in IoT context. However, in this case, both Basic RAPPOR or 
One time RAPPOR need to use Bloom filter that can hash a 
string or very few bits each one time. In consideration of mas-
sive batches of data, there are difficult to address, potentially 
causing surveyors to adopt the less effective privacy protec-
tions [11]. 
In the IoT and fog computing environment, the terminal 
devices often need to process data by batch. For example, 
smart meter collects energy consumption data and send it eve-
ry 15 minutes. Although RAPPOR is a good machine of dif-
ferential privacy, it is hard to process data in such volume. 
In this paper, we propose an improved randomized re-
sponse algorithm that could protect consumer’s privacy from 
behavior signatures and our contributions are summarized as 
follows: 
(1) The proposed algorithm is applicable for privacy pro-
tection of IoT. Differing from traditional differential private 
approaches, we add randomized response noise into the behav-
ior signatures matrix to achieve an acceptable utility-privacy 
tradeoff. 
(2) The key of the design is that we propose a behavior 
signature modeling method based on sparse coding instead of 
boom filter. After some lightweight trainings using the energy 
consumption data, the dictionary will be associated with the 
behavior characteristics of the electric appliances. The diction-
ary learning is sparse. 
(3) At last, the performance of our scheme is compared 
with the state of the arts. The experimental results show that 
our algorithm can achieve a good balance between data-utility 
and privacy, hence is better applicable to IoT applications. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
introduces the related work and background. In section III, our 
algorithm is presented in detail. In section IV, security and 
utility analysis are given. In section V, the performance of our 
scheme is evaluated. In section VI, the paper is concluded. 
II. RELATED WORK 
A. Differential privacy 
Dwork [1] has proposed the notion of differential privacy 
for privacy-preserving in statistical datasets. In addition, he 
has also proposed how to realize differential privacy by noise 
addition [33]. McSherry [34] studied the property of the paral-
lel composition and stable transformation in differential priva-
cy. Kifer [8] analyzed the privacy-utility tradeoff and provided 
the metrics for data-utility. Differential privacy in smart grid 
has been discussed in [28-32], and the fault-tolerance problem 
during data aggregation has been analyzed in [31] [35]. Bar-
bosa [36] firstly applied differential privacy against NILM 
(Non-Intrusive Load Monitoring) to protect the data collected 
by smart meters. 
1) Definition of differential privacy 
M is a privacy mechanism. For any datasets 1D and 2D , 
differing from at most one element, M satisfies   -differential 
privacy if the two datasets satisfy the following condition: 
1 2{ ( ) } { ( ) }r rP M D S e P M D S
     
S represents the range of ( )iM D . The smaller the value of 
 is, the higher the degree of privacy preservation can be 
achieved. 
2) Property1: Parallel Composition [34] 
 1 2, ... nM M M are different privacy mechanisms with the 
privacy budgeting parameters 1 2, ... n   . Then, the combined 
algorithm 1 1 2 2( ( ), ( )... ( ))n nM M D M D M D provides (max )i -
differential privacy for the disjoint datasets 1 2, ... nD D D . 
3) Property2: Stable Transformations [34] 
For any two databases E and F, we say T provides c-stable 
if it meets the following condition. 
| ( ) ( ) | | |T E T F c E F                                             (1) 
If the privacy preserving mechanism M provides  -
𝜀differential privacy and T is a c-stable transformation, the 
combination of M T  provides ( )c  - ε × c  differential 
privacy. 
B. Randomized responses 
Randomized Response [43] is a survey technique devel-
oped in the 1960s for collecting statistics on sensitive topics 
where survey respondents wish to retain confidentiality. 
Erlingsson[9] proposed RAPPOR as a differential privacy 
machine, and answered how to recover distributional parame-
ters from the responses. RAPPOR becomes a widely used dif-
ferential privacy approach. The consideration of several bits 
jointly, had to wait for a subsequent operation, Fanti  proposed 
an improved Algorithm [10] to deal with several bits jointly. 
Staal A. Vinterbo extended RAPPOR to as n-dimensional[11] 
RAPPOR performs the following steps: Firstly, hash cli-
ent's value onto the Bloom filter.  
Then let 
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ix  represents the original energy consumption data. 
'
i
x  represents the data after being obfuscated by 
RAPPOR. 
C. Sparse  Coding 
Sparse coding is a kind of method for learning sets of 
over-complete bases to represent data efficiently. It has multi-
ple variances such as hierarchical sparse coding [37], non-
negative sparse coding [38] and has been applied in many 
fields like NILM, audio classification [39] and source separa-
tion [40].  In the field of smart grid, Kolter [37] extended the 
sparse coding to improve the accuracy of a large-scale energy 
disaggregation task and Elhamifar’s [40] designed a method 
based on sparse coding to extract signature consumption pat-
tern. Jenatton [41] proposed an optimal method for the regu-
larization of hierarchical sparse coding. Singh [42] proposed a 
greedy deep sparse coding for energy disaggregation.  
The aim of sparse coding is to find dictionary ntiB R

such that the input vector ix  can be represented as a linear 
combination of n basis functions as follows. 
i i ix B A   
Here, iB  denotes the dictionary and the number of basis 
function n  is larger than the dimensionality of data 𝑥𝑖 . The 
activation matrix 1niA R
 is sparse, which means the sets of 
activations contain mostly zero entries. The sparse coding cost 
function is defined as follows. 
2
0, 0
,
min || || ( )
i i
i i F i pq
A B
p q
x B A A
 
    
|| ||FY represents the Frobenius norm of Y  and the value 
of F is always set to two in sparse coding. C  represents a con-
stant. 
j
iB  denotes the jth column of matrix iB . For a dataset 
Xˆ  composed of v elements, the sparse coding can be shown 
as follows.   denotes the weight of sparsity. 
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III. FRAMEWORK AND ALGORITHM  
A. Design Goal 
In general, as shown in Figure 1, the objective of the 
attacker is to infer household activity from the power 
consumption data. 
Specifically, the attack model is  
 (1) With the total energy consumption of all consumers 
in a region at a certain time, inferring the consumption of a 
certain consumer. 
 (2) With the total energy consumption of a consumer 
over a period of time, inferring the behavior of that consumer. 
Inherited from Barbosa’s [36] design goals, our schemes 
focus on the following aspects: 
(1) Enabling the calculation of the total consumption of a 
consumer over a period of time (e.g., monthly billing); 
(2) Enabling the calculation of the total consumption of 
all consumers in a region at a certain instant of time; 
(3) Avoiding the measurement of the instantaneous con-
sumption of an individual consumer at a certain instant of 
time. 
Besides, we also propose two new design goals. 
(4) Providing  -differential privacy without generating a 
serious impact on the data-utility. 
(5) The obfuscated data should not be far from the original 
data in case that the adversary removes the noise to get the real 
data. 
 
 
(a) attack model I from [31] 
 
 
(b) attack model II from [44] 
 
Figure.1. As shown in (a), for some consumers in a region at a certain instant of time, the adversary may learn a certain consumer’s consumption data and 
then infer the consumer’s behaviors and habits.. As shown in (b), for a consumer over a period of time, the adversary may learn the switch states of each appliance 
by NILM and then infer the consumer’s behaviors and habits.
B.  System Framework 
As shown in figure.2, the algorithm takes in the real en-
ergy consumption data, and performs the following steps: 
(1)  Train the dictionaries (basis functions) 
This step can be complete by a trusted fog using histori-
cal data as the training set. If the electric utility data is trusted 
by customers, the dictionaries can be trained from electric util-
ity data that are sent to the fog. Although the cost of training 
may be time-consuming, this work does not need to be carried 
out repeatedly, and it can be completed at the more powerful 
fog layer. 
(2)  Sparse coding 
This step can be completed by the trusted fog regularly 
(e.g., 15 minutes), along with the data collected from the 
smart meter. 
(3) Randomized response 
This step can be completed by the trusted fog. 
(4)  Data re-aggregation. 
This step can be completed by the trusted fog. 
(5) Report. Send the generated report S to the server. 
This step can be completed by the trusted fog. An end-to-
end connection between the smart meter and the utility that 
could send noisy data. 
C. Sparse coding 
The energy consumption data 1 tY   can be disaggregated 
by sparse coding as follows: 
𝑌′𝑡×1 = 𝐵𝑡×𝑛𝐴𝑛×1 ≈ 𝑌𝑡×1                             (2) 
Here, t denotes the amount of time slots, which is one 
deal in whole date set. n is the number of basic functions b , 
which is larger than 𝑡. The dictionary 1[ ... ]t n nB b b   is related 
to the energy consumption dynamics corresponding to the dif-
ferent operation modes of a device. 1nA  is the activation ma-
trix. 
Dictionaries are the critical factor to sparse coding.  
In IoT, efficient dictionary should be associated with the 
energy consumption data, Switch state of the appliance and the 
behavior signature. Energy consumption data is collected from 
smart meters, which is a common IoT application considered 
in many schemes such as [17] [18]. The switch state of an ap-
pliance is the appliance consumption patterns (ON/OFF) of a 
particular consumer [38]. The privacy-preserving requirement 
is that the application consumption patterns should not reflect 
a particular consumer’s behavior at home, such as presence or 
absence, sleep-wake-cycles and other personal behaviors. 
To achieve the desired goal using sparse coding, two im-
portant conditions must be satisfied: 
• The combining error must small. 
𝐵𝑡×𝑛𝐴𝑛×1 − 𝑌𝑡×1 → 0 
• The Activations matrix 𝐴𝑛×1 is sparse 
𝐴𝑛×1 = {𝑎1, 𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑖} 
Element ai should be as close to 0 as possible. 
It's obvious that the random initial dictionary 𝐵  is far 
away from this goal, hence a continuous optimization process 
is required. 
 
 
 
Figure.2. The process of our algorithm, training data, testing data and obfuscated data are represented by pale blue. The data processing like supervised learn-
ing, modified sparse coding, noise addition and data re-aggregation is represented by orange. Basic functions (dictionaries), aggregated activations and obfuscated 
activations belong to the intermediate data. Firstly, we train the basic functions based on supervised learning. Then, we predict the aggregated activations based on 
modified sparse coding from the testing data. At last, noise is added into activation and we get the obfuscated data by data re-aggregation.
D. Training dictionary 
The process of training the dictionary is described as fol-
lows:  
Firstly, define a suitable objective function with the 
dictionary  𝐵  and activation 𝐴 . Then, the objective function 
iterates, which solidifies and improves the dictionary B and 
activation A alternatively (solidifies the activation A and 
improves dictionary 𝐵 , then solidifies the dictionary 𝐵  and 
improve activation A). This process is repeated until 
convergence, in which dictionary 𝐵 is appropriate.  
The objective function is defined as follows. 
2
1 1 2 1|| || ( )t t n n nY B A f A                                              (3) 
Here, || ||FY represents the Frobenius norm of Y and the 
value of F is always set to 2 in sparse coding. C represents a 
constant. 
j
iB  denotes the jth column of matrix iB . Xˆ  is a da-
taset composed of v elements.   denotes the weight of sparsi-
ty. 
Here, 
2
1 1 2|| ||t t n nY B A    represents the cost of data-
reconstruction. 
1( )nf A  is the restrictive condition of activation matrix 
1nA  , where 1( )nf A   is a sparsity cost function which penalize 
𝑎𝑖 for being far from zero. A typical choice is: 
1 1 1( )=||A ||n nf A   . 
1|| ||n tA  captures the sparsity condition  
The objective function based on sparse coding for the ag-
gregated data sampling from v devices can be defined to be 
2
1
1 1 1
1
2
min [ ... ] ... || ||
t
t n
i
t
a
Y b b A
a


 
  
 
  
                            (4) 
Given an energy consumption vector 1tY  , to generate an 
acceptable dictionary, we train the dictionary as follows: 
Firstly, we give an initial dictionary 0Bˆ . According to the 
energy consumption profile of each appliance’ state, we get 
vector set 1 2,{ , ... }nb b b  . Each vector jb  corresponds to the 
energy consumption dynamics in a different operation mode of 
a given device. As shown in figure.3, for example, the energy 
consumption profiles of the fridge and washer dryer are inter-
mittent and fluctuant even when they are at ON state. Addi-
tionally, the energy consumption profiles of a device in differ-
ent operation models are not linear.  
2
1
,
1
ˆ ˆarg min ( )
i i
t
j i
b a F
j
A Y B A f A

                               (5) 
To find the representative basis function, we combine 
several continuous data segments to serve as the initial dic-
tionary denoted by 0Bˆ  
  Secondly, we input the initial dictionary 0Bˆ  to estimate 
the new activations and dictionary until convergence.  
2
1
,
1
ˆˆ arg min ( )
i i
t
j j
b a F
j
B Y BA f A

                             (6) 
subject to ‖𝑎𝑗‖
2
≤ δ0 and ‖𝑌 − 𝐵𝐴‖ ≤ σ    
Here, δ0represents the upper bound of ratio 0 in Activa-
tion 𝐴 
We also show the detailed process of dictionary training 
in Algorihm1. 
 TABLE.1 ALGORIHM OF DICTIONARY TRAINING 
Algorithm1. Dictionary Training 
Input: , 
TrainDateY , 0Bˆ ,  ,   
Sparse coding pre-training: 
    1 Initialize 0Bˆ  randomly 
    2 0 0
ˆ ˆ{ , }TrainDateA Y B  
Dictionary training: 
3. Iterate until convergence 
    a) 
2
1 1
1
ˆ ˆargmin ( )
t
i i
F
i
A Y B A f A

     
  b)  
2
1 1
1
ˆˆ argmin ( )
t
j j
F
i
B Y BA f A

     
subject to  ‖𝑎𝑗‖
2
≤ δ0 and ‖𝑌 − 𝐵𝐴‖ ≤ σ 
Output:  B 
E. Randomized Response 
For each energy consumption data batch 𝑌, sparse coding 
is used to optimized Dictionary 𝐵 through training. Then we 
can get a activations 𝐴 = {𝑎1, 𝑎2, … 𝑎𝑛}， 
Let  
𝑎𝑘′ =
{
  
 
  
 𝑎1, 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
𝑐1
𝑖
𝑓
𝑎2, 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
𝑐2
𝑖
𝑓
……
𝑎𝑖 , 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
𝑐𝑗
𝑖
𝑓
𝑎𝑘, 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 1 − 𝑓
 
where 𝑓 is a user-tunable parameter controlling the level of 
longitudinal privacy guarantee that related to 𝜀. 
F. Data Re-aggregation 
Based on the obfuscated activation and dictionary , we can 
generate the obfuscated energy consumption data 'Y  as 
follows: 
' 'Y BA           
Since the sparse coding is a linear mapping, the final 
obfuscated data 'Y satisfies  -differential privacy (proof is in 
the next section). However, the final obfuscated result may 
have a bad impact on the data-utility.  
We also show the whole process of the algorithm in Al-
gorihm2. 
TABLE.2 RANDOMIZED RESPONSE ALGORITHM 
Algorithm2. Randomized Response Algorithm 
Input: , 
TrainDateY 𝑌, TestDateY , ,  ,   
Dictionary training (utility enterprise or fog): 
    Step 1 Initialize 0Bˆ  and 0Aˆ  
Step 2 Dictionary training: 𝐵 ← 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 
Sparse coding(fog or smart meter): 
Step 3 computing 𝐴 according to 𝐵 
𝐴 ← 𝐵 
Randomized Response (fog or smart meter): 
Step 4 computing 𝐴′ according to 𝐴 
𝐴′ ← 𝐴 
Data Re-aggregation (fog or smart meter): 
Step 5 re-aggregation 
𝑌′ = 𝐵𝐴′ 
Output: 'Y  
IV. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY ANALYSIS 
A. Privacy of Sparse coding 
Theorem 1: Sparse coding still satisfies  -differential 
privacy. 
Proof: 
Let 𝑌 = 𝑦1, 𝑦2… , 𝑦𝑘  be a batch of energy consumption 
data. After sparse coding and re-aggregation, 𝐵 and 𝐴 are ob-
tained, 𝑌′ = 𝐵𝐴 , and 𝑌′ = 𝑦′1, 𝑦′2… , 𝑦′𝑘  is the 
randomized response generated by the algorithm according to 𝑌.  
Suppose that M is a privacy machine  which satisfies   -
differential privacy,  
𝑃𝑟{𝑀(𝑌1) ⊆ 𝑆} ≤ 𝑒
𝜀 × 𝑃𝑟{𝑀(𝑌2) ⊆ 𝑆} 
The sparse coding algorithm can be viewed as a stable 
transformation  𝑇.  
𝑇: 𝑌′ = 𝐵𝑡×𝑛𝐴𝑛×1  
       and   ‖𝑌 − 𝐵𝐴‖ ≤ δ2  , δ2  is an infinitesimal small 
number close to 0. We suppose that 𝑌′ = 𝐵𝐴. 
So  
𝑃𝑟{𝑀(𝑌′1) ⊆ 𝑆} ≤ 𝑒
𝜀 × 𝑃𝑟{𝑀(𝑌′2) ⊆ 𝑆} 
After sparse coding, privacy machine 𝑀 still satisfies   -
differential privacy. 
Proof: 
Our scheme T can be expressed as follows: 
1 : 1 1'
SparseCodeing
YT Y Y                                         
2 : 2 2'
SparseCodeing
YT Y Y                                              
Supposed that  𝑇(𝑌1) = 𝐵1𝐴1 = 𝑌1 
𝑇(𝑌2) = 𝐵2𝐴2 = 𝑌2 
|𝑇(𝑌1) + 𝑇(𝑌2)| ≤ 𝑐|𝑌1 + 𝑌2| 
                  
In which the sparse coding
 
𝑇 is c-stable and the value of c 
is 1. 
According to the property2 of differential privacy, transfor-
mation aT  satisfies  -differential privacy. 
B. Privacy of Random Response Algorithm 
Theorem 2: The Random Response Algorithm satisfies  -
differential privacy 𝜀 = ln (
1−𝑓
𝛿0𝑓
). 
Proof: 
    Let 𝑦𝑘′ =
{
 
 
 
 𝑦′1, 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
1
𝑖
𝑓
𝑦′2, 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
1
𝑖
𝑓
……
𝑦′𝑖 , 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
1
𝑖
𝑓
𝑦′𝑘, 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 1 − 𝑓
 
𝑅𝑅 is the bounded by 𝑒𝜀 
𝑅𝑅 =
𝑃(𝑦′ ∈ 𝑆|𝑦 = 𝑦1)
𝑃(𝑦′ ∈ 𝑆|𝑦 = 𝑦2)
 
𝑅𝑅 ≤ 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑃(𝑦′ ∈ 𝑆|𝑦 = 𝑦1)
𝑃(𝑦′ ∈ 𝑆|𝑦 = 𝑦 2)
 
considering the sparsity of activations 𝐴, most 𝑦′ = 0 
when 𝑦′ = 0,  
𝑅𝑅 =
𝑃(𝑦′ ∈ 𝑆|𝑦 = 𝑦 1)
𝑃(𝑦′ ∈ 𝑆|𝑦 = 𝑦 2)
 
𝑅𝑅 = (1 − 𝑓)2 × (𝛿0𝑓)
−2 
𝑅𝑅 = (
𝛿0𝑓
1 − 𝑓
) 
𝜀 = ln (
1 − 𝑓
𝛿0𝑓
) 
V. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY ANALYSIS 
In this section, using the REDD Data Set [46] and the 
Nilmtk toolkit [47], we measure the performance of our 
scheme in terms of the level of privacy preservation.  
F1-score is an efficient metric to measure the privacy-
preserving level, which can be calculated as follows: 
                         
Here, Precision and Recall represent the positive predictive 
value and the recall sensitivity respectively. When the F1-
score goes high, the application usage patterns can be tracked 
more accurately.  
2 Pr Re
1
Pr +Recall
ecision call
F score
ecision
 
 
The commonality shares by Barbosa’s scheme, Sankar’s 
scheme and our scheme is the obfuscation of energy consump-
tion data via noise addition. However, these schemes preserve 
consumer’s privacy at different levels. Barbosa adds the noise 
into energy consumption data directly. Sankar and us add 
noise into appliance consumption signatures. 
As shown in Table.3, we compare the F1-scores of our 
scheme with Barbosa, Sankar and the classical NILM algo-
rithm (FHMM). From the experiment results, we demonstrate 
that our scheme’s F1-score is lower than the other schemes, 
which means that it is more difficult to extract the customer’s 
behavior privacy from the noisy energy consumption data in 
our scheme. Therefore, compared to the other schemes, our 
scheme has a better privacy-preserving level. 
TABLE.3 COMPARISON OF OUR ALGORITHM WITH OTHER TRADITIONAL 
ALGORITHMS  
 Our Algo-
rithm 
Sankar's[45] 
Algorithm 
Barbosa's[36] 
Algorithm 
without 
noise 
Fridge  0.53 0.64 0.65 0.65 
Light1 0.58 0.65 0.64 0.71 
washer 
1dryer 
0.44 0.50 0.49 0.54 
Light2 0.19 0.23 0.23 0.23 
As shown in Table3, we add noise into different schemes 
to generate the obfuscated data and then calculate the F1-
scores of fridge, light, oven and washer dryer using different 
with FHMM algorithm. The blue bar represents the F1-score 
of our scheme, which is higher than the other schemes. The 
lower F1-scoreamounts to lower precision rate, which means 
the behavior signatures are harder to extract in our scheme. 
Thus, by adding noise into the energy consumption signature, 
our scheme has a better privacy-preserving level. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we proposed a Randomized Response 
Algorithm using the sparse coding to replace Boom filter. The 
algorithm can achieve differential privacy on batches of data. 
The algorithm is able to better fulfill the trade-off between 
privacy and utility in the fog environment against IoT privacy. 
Therefore, the appliance consumption patterns can be masked 
even if the adversary has obtained the near real-time load 
profile. At last, we analyzed the feasibility of our scheme and 
compared it with other traditional algorithms in IoT. Our 
algorithm can also be applied to other fields. In future, we will 
focus on extending the sparse coding to further preserve user’s 
privacy without compromising the data-utility. 
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